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Abstract: The Schyns et al. target article demonstrates that different
classifications entail different representations, implying “flexible space
learning.” We argue that flexibility is required even at the within-category
level.
We welcome this timely emphasis on the need for “flexible spaces”
in categorization. In this commentary, we ask how far the points
made must be taken. The target article stresses that new features
are required by new categorizations and that assuming a single,
fixed, object representation suited for all possible classifications is
unrealistic. Our work on similarity-based categorization (Hahn
1996; Hahn & Chater, in press) has stressed that fixed, uniform
representations are inappropriate even within a category. Where
Schyns et al. emphasize that, for example, a single fixed-length
vector for object representation is insufficient across categories,
our aim has been to show how a single fixed-length vector
representation is overly restrictive even for a single category. That
“uniform feature spaces” are insufficient even within a category
becomes apparent with the analysis of real-world materials such as
legal cases (Hahn 1996), but more real-world categories suffice
equally: imagine encountering a particular chair, one with a back
rest and four legs; the next exemplar encountered might have
armrests too – a new “dimension” that comes into play only at this
point, yet another chair might have a swivel base instead of four
legs, and so on. The “feature space” for the category emerges only
gradually as more and more examples are encountered. The
crucial point, however, is that for many categories, if not most, it is
never definitively fixed. New, previously unanticipated variations
can arise all the time. The problem is not simply that of encounter-
ing a sufficient number of exemplars to allow determination of the
space of possibilities, because this space generally is not bounded
(at least from the agent perspective). This follows from consider-
ing a key difficulty for rule-based systems, that rules – whether
attempting to govern everyday, commonsense knowledge or spe-
cialist domains such as law – almost always admit of exceptions
(Hahn & Vogel 1997; Oaksford & Chater 1991; Reiter 1980).
These exceptions, which are both unforeseeable and too nu-
merous to allow enumeration in advance, require the ability to
perform nonmonotonic or default reasoning in rule-based con-
texts. But that potentially relevant features are not exhaustively
known in advance does not just affect rules and rules alone. They
are equally unavailable for any mode of organizing conceptual
knowledge. Thus, realistic models of categorization must allow
representation and evaluation of “novel” features.
That this is not just a pedantic point that can be ignored in
practice is documented by work in machine learning and artificial
intelligence. The problem is well known in the context of rule-
based systems (Reiter 1980), but instance-based approaches to
classification in machine learning have also recognized the need to
confront the problem of “novel attributes” (Aha 1992). The aim of
this research is to build classification systems that work with
practical problems, not ambitious cognitive models. Cognitive
modeling should treat the issue all the more seriously.
There is a serious problem, then, for any account of categoriza-
tion that assumes fixed representations, whether this strait-jacket
of uniform representation stems from practical considerations
about representation and learning procedures (e.g., backpropaga-
tion networks) or stems from the very nature of theory (e.g., spatial
models of similarity).
Our own approach to similarity and categorization is based on
the notion of transformation between objects, a general concept
that encompasses similarity as “feature-overlap” or as distance in
similarity-space as a special, restrictive case (Chater & Hahn 1997;
Hahn & Chater 1997). Similarity between objects is assumed to
depend on the ease of transformation of the representation of one
object into representations of the other. Psychology has seen
transformational accounts of similarity advanced in the past
(Franks & Bransford 1971; Imai 1977). Our account of “represen-
tational distortion” provides a foundation in terms of the notion of
Information Distance from the branch of algorithmic complexity
theory known as Kolmogorov complexity (Li & Vitanyi 1993).
Crucial for the present context is the concept that similarity
assessment no longer conceives of objects as residing in a feature
space, but instead in transformation space. Features are only of
interest as the objects of transformations; in this sense, the account
is independent of particular features. As a consequence, there is
no need for the same set of features to be present throughout.
Also, the same features can be the object of different transforma-
tions as these arise from the particular pair of stimuli under
consideration. The search for transformations itself influences the
features found; consequently, the same basic features can give rise
to different stimulus descriptions as a function of the particular
comparison.
